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COMMENTS
EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
The practice of limiting and guarding the use of confessions in
criminal prosecutions began in the latter part of the sixteenth century,
and developed because of civilized desire to show consideration for
persons accused of crime who were treated harshly and severely. Be-
fore the sixteenth century there were no restrictions upon the use and
admissibility of confessions. In the latter seventeen-hundreds confes-
sions were more frequently recognized as unreliable. The principle
of exclusion developed gradually, and today courts carefully scrutinize
confessions and the manner in which they are obtained.'
The first problem to be considered here is the admissibility of con-
fessions in state courts. Courts and legislatures generally are free to
develop their court procdure according to their own policy, but due
process requires that state action shall not be contrary to the funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice. If the Supreme Court encoun-
ters practices that are not consistent with these principles it will con-
sider the question of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The nature of the due process clause gives wide range to the reviewing
power of the Supreme Court over convictions in state courts.
The question of admissibility of confessions in a state court was
first considered by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Missisippi.2 The
State of Mississippi claimed it was free to regulate the procedure of
its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy. There was
evidence of spurious confessions obtained by brutal treatment. The
beatings of the defendants were admitted by officers at the trial, and
the defendants were convicted solely on the basis of the confessions so
obtained. The convictions were reversed by the Supreme Court be-
cause of denial of due process. Chief Justice Hughes said,
"The State may abolish trial by jury. It may dispense with
indictment by grand jury and substitute complaint or informa-
tion. But the freedom of the State in establishing its policy is
the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the
requirement of due process of law. Because a State may dis-
1 Rule 505, American Law Institute Code of Evidence: "Evidence of a hearsay
statement by an accused that he has done or omitted something the doing or
omission of which constitutes a crime or an essential part of a crime is ad-
missible against him in a criminal action if the judge finds that (a) the ac-
cused was not induced to make the statement by (i) infliction of physical
suffering upon him or threats thereof, or (ii) threats or promises, likely to
cause him to make such a statement falsely, which concerned action to be
taken by a public official with reference to the crime and were made by a
person whom the accused reasonably believed to have the power or authority
to secure the execution of the threats or promises, and (b) the accused when
making the statement was conscious and was capable of understanding what
he said and did."
2 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936).
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pence with a jury trial, it does not follow that it may substitute
trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may not be sub-
stituted for the witness stand. The State may not permit an ac-
cused to be hurried to conviction under mob domination-where
the whole proceeding is but a mask-without supplying correc-
tive process."
Use by a state court of an improperly obtained confession may
constitute a denial of due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This was illustrated again in Chambers v. Florida3 where
Brown v. Mississippi was followed. Undisputed evidence showed that
compulsion was applied to secure the confessions involved. In one
case the prisoner was taken out on nightly rides so that officers could
talk to him, and because (the officers said) the jail was too crowded
for proper interrogation. Local officers were not sure how many times
the prisoner was taken on these "night persecution trips". The State
insisted that the confession was signed by the prisoner and therefore
was voluntary. The Supreme Court held that a confession so obtained
fell short of procedural due process guaranteed by the Constitution.
4
Denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental
fairness which is essential to our concept of justice. Where a prisoner
is held incommunicado and subjected to questioning for long periods
the Court will scrutinize the record of the trial to determine if use of
the confession deprives him of liberty or life without due process. Law
enforcement officers must realize that if they obtain confessions through
oppressive means they defeat rather than further the ends of justice.
In many cases the officers come close to the line. Where a prisoner ex-
hibits coolness, self-possession and admits that no threats, promises, or
acts of physical violence were offered during long periods of question-
ing, the Court may find that due process has not been denied. 5 Each
state has the right to prescribe the tests governing the admissibility of
confessions. Every state may have a different test, but when the ques-
tion is raised whether or not due process has been denied, the Supreme
Court is not precluded by a jury verdict from determining whether the
methods of obtaining the confession were such that admission might
amount to denial of due process.6
An example of how prosecutors sometimes extract a "voluntary"
confession is illustrated in Ashcraft v. Tennessee.7 Ashcraft, a citizen
of excellent reputation was suspected of murdering his wife. For
3 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472 (1940) ; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629, 60 S.Ct.
612 (1940).
4 White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 60 S.Ct. 1032 (1940), Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S.
544, 61 S.Ct. 956 (1941); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 574, 61 S.Ct. 1092
(1941).
5 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941).
6 Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 62 S.Ct. 1139 (1942).
7322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944).
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thirty-six hours after his seizure, during which period he was held in-
communicado, without sleep or rest, relays of officers, experienced in-
vestigators, and highly trained lawyers questioned him without respite.
From Saturday evening at seven o'clock until Monday morning at nine-
thirty, Ashcraft was not allowed to leave the room. Officers said they
questioned him in relays because they became so tired from the ques-
tioning they were compelled to rest. It is inconceivable that any court
of justice in the land could countenance such a situation. The Con-
stitution of the United States stands as a bar against the conviction of
any individual in an American court by, use of a confession obtained
by such coercion. Some nations allow and are dedicated to an opposite
policy, but under our Constitution we should not have that kind of
government.
Involuntary confessions may be given simultaneously with or sub-
sequent to unlawful pressure, force, or threats. Whether the confession
is voluntary or involuntary depends on the conclusion as to whether
the accused is in possession of mental freedom to confess or deny his
part in the crime. A confession may be obtained by improper means
and later the accused may tell the facts of the crime to different per-
sons. The second confession may be admissible and not a denial of
due process if the accused had mental freedom when he confessed the
second time. A frank admission to others, after an involuntary con-
fession, under circumstances free of coercion may suggest that the ac-
cused concluded it wise to make a clean breast of his guilt.8
Here we are concerned with the requirement of due process in the
enforcement of criminal law by the states. Due process expresses a
demand for'civilized legal procedure. It is not a stagnant formulation
of what has been achieved in the past, but a standard of judgment in
the progressive -evolution of the institution of a free society. The ques-
tion is not whether by means of a confession a prisoner was forced to
self-incrimination, but whether the criminal proceedings which resulted
in his conviction deprived him of the due process of law by which he
was constitutionally entitled to have his guilt determined. If any co-
erced confession is used at the trial, subsequent confessions may not
be considered as curing the error and the Court must regard such treat-
ment as clear denial of due process.9
In Ohio a fifteen-year old boy was convicted of murder in the first
degree in the state court and sentenced to life imprisonment. The boy
was taken from his home at midnight and questioned until morning by
relays of policemen. He confessed, and the typewritten, signed con-
fession began with information of the boy's constitutional rights and
8 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944).
9 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945).
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by stating that the confession was free and no force was used. The
Supreme Court could not square such a confession with due process.
Involved here was a mere child and he was an easy victim of the law.
A fifteen-year-old, questioned through the dead of night by relays of
police, is an easy victim of inquisition. A boy needs counsel and sup-
port if he is not to become the victim of fear and panic. A boy of
fifteen would not have full appreciation of police advice of his con-
stitutional rights. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits police from
using the private, secret custody of either man or child as a device for
wringing confessions from them.'
The due process clause invalidates a state court conviction ground-
ed in whole or in part upon a confession which is the product of other
than reasoned and voluntary choice. A conviction resulting from use
of a coerced confession is no less void because the accused testified
he did not confess at all. Such testimony cannot legalize a procedure
which- conflicts with due process. Inconsistent testimony regarding a
confession should not and cannot prevent the accused from raising the
constitutional issue of due process."
In Watts v. Indiana,12 the accused was kept for two days in solitary
confinement in a cell called "the hole" and interrogated in five nightly
sessions. Denial of sleep and food were a part of the total situation from
which the confessions came. The court reversed the convictions. In
holding that the due process clause bars police procedure which violates
basic notions of fair play, the Court discussed the due process clause in
its historic setting as assuring appropriate procedure before liberty
is curtailed or life is taken. Our system is not the inquisitorial one,
but rather the accusatorial. This has been our system of criminal jus-
tice since the day of the Star Chamber, where an accused was secretly
questioned for hours at a time. Under our accusatorial system society
has the burden of proof against the accused and such proof is not to be
out of his own mouth. The law should not allow a prisoner to be the
instrument of his own conviction. If force has been applied to obtain
a confession it will not be left to local determination whether the con-
fession was voluntary or not. Force of body is not all the Court should
look for because there is torture of mind as well as body. The will of
man is affected by fear as much as by force. The Court should not be
ignorant as judges of what they know as men.13
The power of the Supreme Court to review convictions in the fed-
eral courts is not limited to the determination of constitutional validity.
10 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1947).
11 Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742, 68 S.Ct. 300 (1947).1"338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949).
"3 Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 69 S.Ct. 1352 (1949); Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct. 1354 (1949).
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The Court has judicial supervision in addition to review of constitu-
tional questions. Congress has explicitly commanded that arresting
officers shall have the duty of taking accused immediately before the
nearest United States Commissioner or nearest judicial officer having
jurisdiction for a hearing, and commitment or the taking of bail.14
The tests as to confessions in the state courts vary, but the Supreme
Court has formulated those tests which are to govern in trials in federal
courts. The requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing
merely that the confession was not induced by threat or promise. A
confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may
have been the character of the compulsion. 15 In formulation of rules
of evidence for criminal trials in the federal courts, the Court has been
guided by considerations of justice and has not been limited as with a
state court confession to the due process issue.16
In McNabb v. United States,'7 the Government urged that the Con-
stitution proscribes only involuntary confessions, and that judged by
appropriate criteria of involuntariness, the confessions were voluntary
and hence admissible. The McNabbs were arrested in the middle of
the night at their home. Instead of being brought before an officer for
commitment as the law requires," they were put in a barren cell and
kept there for fourteen hours. They were subjected to unremitting
questioning for two days. Plainly a conviction based on evidence ob-
tained by such flagrant disregard of the command of Congress could
not be allowed to stand. Rules of evidence for criminal trials in the
federal courts are made a part of the living law and should not be
treated as a mere collection of wooden rules in a game.19
But where illegal detention is subsequent to admissions of guilt,
use of such admissions is not a denial of due process. The Supreme
Court reasoned in United States v. Mitchell20 that the disclosures were
were not elicifed through illegal conduct by, officers. Here the prisoner
admitted his guilt to a charge of burglary a few minutes after his
apprehension. He was detained for eight days in an attempt to clear
up previous similar crimes. The detention was illegal, but the illegality
did not act retroactively to invalidate a confession made under proper
circumstances.
14 18 U.S.C. section 595.
i5 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183 (1897); Wan v. United
States, 266 U.S. 1, 45 S.Ct. 1 (1924).
16 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 S.Ct. 212 (1933); Wolfe v. United
States, 291 U.S. 7, 54 S.Ct. 279 (1933).
17 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1942).
is Supra, note 14.
19 Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct. 599 (1942).
20 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896 (1943).
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The rule of the McNabb2l case was followed in Upshaw v. United
States.2 2 It was conceded that the confessions were "the fruits of
wrongdoings" by the officers. The accused was detained for at least
thirty hours for the purpose of securing the confession. He was held
by officers because there wasn't sufficient evidence for the courts to
hold him. The arresting officer stated that even if the court would
hold the prisoner, custody would be lost and the questioning would be
impossible. Since the McNabb rule bars admission of confessions in
federal courts when there is a delay before commitment, the confes-
sions were held to be inadmissible. There was a vigorous dissent by
Justice Reed who felt that the detention alone, even for the purpose of
obtaining information, should not be sufficient to justify the exclusion
of a confession after unnecessary delay and before commitment. The
McNabb rule is that illegal detention alone will bar a confession. Jus-
tice Reed said that this was an improper extension of the rule, and it
should not make any difference if a voluntary confession was obtained
during illegal detention.
When not inconsistent with a statute or the Constitution, there is
no doubt of the power of the Supreme Court to institute, on its own
initiative, procedural reform in the federal courts. 2 The McNabb rule
that illegal detention vitiates any confessions obtained during that time
governs in the federal courts, but the procedure regarding confessions
used in the state courts searches for a denial of due process. To declare
that there is a denial of due process the court must find that the trial
was infected by an absence of fairness. Such unfairness is present
when a coerced confession is used. It is the duty of the court to hear
and consider evidence as to whether a confession was freely and vol-
untarily made. The court should consider the condition, situation,
character of the prisoner, and the circumstances under which the con-
fession was made. The courts of the land owe a high duty and respon-
sibility to translate into law and maintain a constitutional shield for
the benefit of every human being subject to our Constitution.
EUGENE F. KOBEY
21 Supra, note 17.
22335 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170 (1948).
23 18 U.S.C. section 687. Rule five of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States.
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